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Crowley: Evidence: The Clinton Administration's Battle to Gain Evidentiary

EVIDENCE: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S BATTLE TO
GAIN EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE FOR SECRET SERVICE
AGENTS-ANOTHER TAINTED LEGACY?
In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
Rubin v. United States 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998)
T. Spencer Crowley, Hr
Appellant, Secretary of the Treasury, asserted a protective function
privilege on behalf of officers of the United States Secret Service to
prevent their testimony in a federal grand jury proceeding.' The privilege,
as described by the Secret Service, would have protected information
obtained by Secret Service. officers while performing their protective2
function in physical proximity to the President of the United States.
Appellee, Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC),3 filed a motion in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to compel their
testimony.4 The district court granted the OIC's motion to compel and
dismissed the Secretary's novel claim, holding that there was no basis in
the Constitution or in U.S. legal history for recognizing the asserted
privilege.5 The Secretary of the Treasury appealed and the United States

* I would like to dedicate this Case Comment to my parents, Tim and Lucy Crowley.
1. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Rubin v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
2. See id. at 1075. The proposed privilege would have absolutely protected "'information
obtained by Secret Service personnel while performing their protective function in physical
proximity to the President.' Id. The privilege would not apply 'in the context of a federal
investigation or prosecution, to bar testimony by an officer or agent concerning observations or
statements that, at the time they were made, were sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for
believing that a felony has been, is being, or will be committed."' Id.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(a) gives the Office of the Independent Counsel authority to exercise
the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(a)
(West 1998). 28 U.S.C.A. § 535 authorizes the Attorney General, and thus the Office of the
Independent Counsel, to investigate crimes involving government officers and employees, including
the President of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 535 (West 1998).
4. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *1 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998), affd by 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5. See id. at *2. The court held that there was "no constitutional basis for recognizing a
protective function privilege. In addition there is no history of the privilege in federal common or
statutory law." Id. at *3. With respect to state law, the court noted that "[n]o state has ever
recognized a protective function privilege or its equivalent." Id. The court concluded by stating that
"[e]ven if a President might distance himself on occasion from the Secret Service out of concern
that its agents or officers might testify against him, the Court simply has no legal basis for
recognizing the protectivefunction privilege." Id. at *4n.3. (emphasis added).
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Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit granted review.6 In
affirming the decision of the trial court, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
HELD, inter alia,7 that the claimed privilege would not be recognized and
did not protect officers from being compelled to testify.8
The Secret Service's claim of a protective function privilege for its
officers finds no support in the U.S. Constitution and has never been
recognized at common law or by statute.9 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides the foundation for claims of evidentiary privilege not
previously recognized and is therefore controlling in the instant case.'0
That rule provides in pertinent part, that evidentiary privileges "shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.""
The history of Rule 501 indicates Congress' intention to leave the
continued development of evidentiary privilege to the courts.' 2 In 1973, the
Supreme Court forwarded to Congress the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence drafted by its Judicial Advisory Committee. 3 This initial
proposal contained nine separate rules which specifically articulated each14
instance in which an evidentiary privilege would be recognized.

6. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075. The Court of Appeals claimed jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1291. See id. Because the recognition of a testimonial privilege is a legal issue, the
court's review was de novo. See id.
7. See id. at 1074. The court also held that the Secretary of the Treasury could pursue an
immediate appeal from the district court's order compelling Secret Service agents' testimony. See
id.
8. See id. at 1079.
9. See supra note 5.
10. See FED. R. EviD. 501.
11. Id. Rule 501 provides in full:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
12. See generally United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1980) (giving a brief
history of the development of Rule 501).
13. See id. at367.
14. See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 501-513,H.R. Doc. No. 93-46, pp. 9-19 (1973).
These Rules defined nine non-constitutional privileges which the courts were obliged to recognize:
required reports; lawyer-client; psychotherapist-patient; husband-wife; communications to clergy;
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However, controversy regarding the scope of the nine privileges arose
during the hearings on the Proposed Rules. 5 As a result of this
controversy, Congress substantially revised the Proposed Rules by deleting
privileges and creating a single rule for all evidentiary
the nine separate
16
privileges.

In essence, the revised version of the Rules17 exhibited Congress' intent
to refrain from freezing the law of privilege "at a particular point in...
history" 8 and allowed the federal courts to "'continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges"' in federal criminal trials.19 In spite
of this expansive power, the federal courts have been reluctant to create or
recognize evidentiary privileges.' The Supreme Court has consistently
reiterated that the integrity of the judicial system depends upon full
disclosure of all relevant facts.21 Evidentiary privileges however, frustrate
this basic principle of the criminal justice system.2 Thus, the federal courts
generally recognize an evidentiary privilege only if the Constitution, the
federal common law' or a majority of the states' support recognition of
political vote; trade secrets; secrets of state and other official information; and identity of informer.
See id.
15. The controversy focused primarily on the scope of the rules and the propriety of any
privileges being promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act, given their arguably substantive effect.
See id. Additionally, there was particular concern about the omission of both the physician-patient
privilege and the marital communications privilege and the inclusion of what some considered to
be an overly broad privilege for state secrets. See id. A final concern surrounded the fact that the
rules as promulgated would have applied to all actions in federal courts, overriding state privilege
law, even where state law supplied the rule of decision. See id.
16. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 367.
17. See i& Rule 501 replaced Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 501-513. See id.
18. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996).
19. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980)).
20. See generallyUniversity of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182,189 (1990) (rejecting
academic peer review privilege); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984)
(rejecting work product immunity for accountants); Gillock,445 U.S. at 373 (rejecting speech-ordebate privilege for state legislators); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51-53 (rejecting privilege against
adverse spousal testimony, but continuing to recognize privilege for confidential marriage
communications); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,705-13 (1974) (rejecting the President's
requests for general confidentiality, but recognizing a qualified executive privilege); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (rejecting accountant-client privilege); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972) (rejecting news reporter's privilege).
21. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
22. See id. The Court in Nixon stated that "these exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search
for truth." Id.
23. See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
24. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998). The Court noted
that "the attorney client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential
communications." Id (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also
Trammel. 445 U.S. at 51-53. The Court stated that "the long history of the privilege [against
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a privilege.
Branzburg v. Hayes26 was one of the first cases to illustrate the
judiciary's reluctance towards creating evidentiary privileges.27 In
Branzburg,the Supreme Court considered whether to extend a privilege to
reporters who refused to disclose their confidential sources.2" The
petitioners in Branzburg29 argued that, if forced to testify against their
confidential sources, the chilling effect on reporting would violate their
First Amendment freedom of press rights.30 The petitioners, therefore,
claimed that a reporter's compelled testimony was constitutionally suspect
and that the Court was required to recognize a "reporter's privilege."'"
In dismissing the petitioners' position, the Court recognized that the
burden on reporting would be notable.32 However, the Court declined to
hold that this effect was sufficient to outweigh the significant public
interest in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings. 33 The Court reasoned
that neither the federal common law nor any federal statute provided
support for the reporter's privilege.' 4 Further, the Court stated that only a
minority of the states had chosen to recognize the reporter's privilege.35
This lack of precedent convinced the Court to reject the petitioners'

adverse spousal testimony in federal courts] suggests that it ought not to be casually set cast aside."
Id.
25. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12 (commenting that State support usually comes from State
legislation or State case law); see also infra note 55.
26. 408 U.S. 665 (1992).
27. See id. at 690-91.
28. See id. at 667-79.
29. See id. The Branzburg case actually involved two different petitioners, Branzburg and
Pappas. See id. Certiorari was granted to resolve conflict between Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) (upholding the refusal of a reporter to appear and testify before a grand
jury with respect to confidential sources) and Branzburg v. Pound,461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
The court also granted certiorari to Petitioner Pappas's case, see In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297
(Mass. 1971) (rejecting claimed right of reporters to refuse to testify before grandjuries with respect
to confidential sources). See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 667-75.
30. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 679-82. Simply put, the petitioners asserted that an essential part
of reporting involves agreements to keep their sources of news confidential. See id. at 680. If the
reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the confidential sources
of all other reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to
the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment. See id.
31. Id.at 682.
32. See id. at 690-91. The Court held that "[oin the records now before us, we perceive no
basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury
proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering."
Id. at 690.
33. See id. at 686-88. "IThe grandjury's authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic
... but essential to its task." Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 685-89.
35. See id.
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arguments despite the privilege's design to protect constitutional rights.36
Valid policy arguments supporting the privilege could not offset the want
of constitutional, statutory or common law precedent for the privilege.
Two years later, in United States v. Nixon,3 s the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of evidentiary privilege in the context of the
Presidency.39 In Nixon, the President challenged a subpoena which directed
him to produce tape recordings and documents of his prior conversations
with Presidential staff members.40 The President claimed the subpoena
would force him to disclose confidential communications protected by an
evidentiary privilege.41 The district court was not receptive to his argument
and denied his motion to quash the subpoena.42 The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's ruling43 and held that a President's generalized
interest in confidentiality was subsumed by a prosecutor's demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a criminal investigation.'
The Nixon Court focused much of its analysis on the dangers of
recognizing evidentiary privileges in a criminal justice system which relies
upon its citizens for full disclosure of all relevant facts.45 The Court
emphasized that evidentiary privileges should be recognized only in
exceptional circumstances' since exclusion of evidence frustrates the most
basic principles of the criminal justice system. Nixon thus stood for the
proposition that any evidentiary privilege runs contrary to the criminal
justice system and has the potential to gravely impair the basic function of
the courts. 4' Therefore, the Court believed that it was essential to limit
36. See id at 690.
37. See id at 686-88.
38.
39.
40.
41.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
See id. at 686.
See id
See id.

42. See id
43. See id. at 686-87. The case never went before the Court of Appeals. See id The Supreme
Court granted both the United States' petition for certiorari before judgement and the President's
cross petition for certiorari before judgment because of the public importance of the issues
presented and their need for prompt resolution. See id
44. See id at713.
45. See id at 709 ('iThe ends of criminal justice would be defeated ifjudgements were to
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.").
46. See id. The court noted that certain constitutional, statutory, and common law privileges
exist to protect important societal interests which are in conflict with one another. See id.(quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,688 (1972) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932))). The Court listed the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination and the attorneyeientprivilege as examples. See
id.
47. See id. ("The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts.").

48. See id.
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evidentiary privileges to those instances where the Constitution, statutes
or common law has determined that the exclusion of relevant evidence has
apublic benefit outweighing the benefits of maintaining the integrity of the
criminal justice system.49
The high standard for recognizing evidentiary privileges established by
the Court's decisions in Nixon and Branzburg0 remained intact until 1996
when the Court decided Jaffee v. Redmond.51 In Jaffee, the Supreme Court
recognized an evidentiary privilege protecting the psychotherapist-patient
relationship. 52 While employing essentially the same analysis as in Nixon
and Branzburg, the Court reasoned that the attendant circumstances in
Jaffee were sufficiently persuasive to overcome the significant public
interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.53 The
Court's decision was primarily based upon the fact that all fifty States and
the District of Columbia had recognized some form of psychotherapistpatient privilege.54 Additionally, the Court noted that the psychotherapistpatient privilege was among the nine specific privileges that the Judicial
Advisory Committee recommended to Congress as part of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973. 5" These two significant factors were
reinforced by the public interest supporting recognition of the privilege 6
and ultimately justified the creation of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.5 7
Jaffee provided that the federal courts would consider the history of a
privilege as well as the policy decisions of the states when determining
whether a privilege should be created or modified.5" However, the Court
did not assert that a compelling public interest could meet the standard
required for creation of an evidentiary privilege.59 The Court merely

49. See id.at 710 n.18. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
50. See id. at 709-10; Branzburg,408 U.S. at 708.
51. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
52. See id. at 18.
53. See id. at l5.
54. See id. at 12 n.11 ("That it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a
psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the District
of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege.").
55. See id. at 10.
56. See id. at 11 ("The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a
public good of transcendent importance.").
57. See id. at 22-23. In a powerful dissent, Justice Scalia accused the Court of giving too little
consideration to the scope of the privilege. See id. at 20 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). He argued that the
Court should have analyzed its decision to allow the privilege to extend to licensed social workers
much more carefully. See id. (Scalia, L,dissenting).
58. See id. at 12-13; see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368, n.8 (1980);
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,48-50 (1979).
59. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss4/8

6

Crowley: Evidence: The Clinton Administration's Battle to Gain Evidentiary
EVIDENTLARYPRIWLEGE FOR SECRET SERVICEAGENTS

provided that policy arguments may reinforce a claim of evidentiary
privilege once some evidence of constitutional, statutory or common law
precedent has been proven.'
In the instant case, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court and declined to recognize an evidentiary privilege based on the
protective function of Secret Service officers in relation to the President.61
In so holding, the instant court noted the lack of state and federal precedent
for the protective function privilege. Yet contrary to the Supreme Court's
prior analyses,62 the instant court held that the absence of this precedence
did not prevent recognition of the privilege.63 Instead, the instant court held
that the relevant inquiry was whether the Secret Service had proven, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the proposed privilege was essential to
the preservation and enhancement of the President's safety.'M The Secret
Service contended that the public interest in ensuring the safety of the
President was sufficient to overcome the President's duty to testify.65
Moreover, they argued that rejection of the asserted privilege would cause
the President to distance himself from his protectors and possibly threaten
his future safety.' Ultimately, the instant court rejected the Secret
Service's reasoning and concluded that their arguments were too
speculative' to overcome the heavy burden weighing against recognition
of the privilege.68

60. See id.
61. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Rubin v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
62. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-88 (1972).
63. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076 ("[W]e do not regard the absence of precedent as
weighing heavily against recognition of the privilege."). See also Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
461 (1998) (Breyer, L,dissenting) (noting his approval of the instant court's finding that the lack
of precedence should not be determinative of whether a privilege is recognized), denying cert. to
148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
64. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076. ("[J]udicial recognition of the privilege depends
entirely upon the Secret Service's ability to establish clearly and convincingly both the need for and
the efficacy of the proposed privilege.").
65. See id.at 1075.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1076 (noting that the arguments of the Secret Service were "based in large part
on speculation-thoughtful speculation, but speculation nonetheless") (quoting Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2088 (1998)); see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94 (stating
that "[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness ofinformants to make
disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a large extent speculative").
68. The arguments which the Supreme Court hears to support claims for evidentiary privilege
are quite varied. Compare Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076 (rejecting as speculative the Secret
Service's arguments that denying a protective function privilege for the President will cause him
to distance himself from his security), andBranzburg,408 U.S. at 693-94 (rejecting as speculative
and widely divergent arguments which assert that issuing subpoenas to confidential informants will
have an inhibiting effect on the informant's future willingness to divulge information to newsmen),
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The D.C. Circuit's rejection of the claimed privilege reiterates the
judiciary's unwillingness to recognize evidentiary privileges.69 Despite this
demonstrated reluctance the instant court failed to explicitly set forth its
standard for determining whether a claimed privilege will be recognized. 0
In asserting-that a compelling public interest was sufficient to create an
evidentiary privilege, the instant court diverged from the Supreme Court's
prior standard
which required something more than a compelling public
interest. 71
The instant court held that the President's physical safety amounts to
the kind of transcendent public good that, in principle, might justify the
recognition of a new privilege.72 Yet, in the end, the Secret Service's
persuasive arguments in favor of the privilege were not sufficient to
demonstrate both the need for and the efficacy of the proposed privilege.73
The instant court stated that any tendency of the President to distance
himself from his protectors would be balanced by the President's
correlative duty to accept protection and the President's own profound
personal interest in being well protected.74 Even if the asserted privilege
was recognized, the instant court noted that the privilege would not provide
an enhanced level of protection because of its awkward operation.' In fact,
the instant court systematically rejected each of the Secret Service's
arguments in a manner which indicates that no public interest could ever
satisfy this lofty standard.76 Despite the court's apparent relaxation of the
standard, the instant court reviewed the Secret Service's claim of privilege
with the same scrutiny that each of the prior claims of privilege has faced.7 7
Regardless of its conclusion, the instant court's analysis remains
unsettling because it departs from the weight of authority which stressed
the importance of precedent in determining whether a privilege will be
recognized. 7' No case recognizing an evidentiary privilege has relied
entirely on a policy argument for support.79 In fact, the presence or absence

with Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12 (upholding a psychotherapist privilege because it "serves the public
interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects
of a mental or emotional problem").
69. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1078-79.
70. See id. The court described a specific standard which would satisfy the facts of the instant
case but failed to offer a general standard for other cases. See id.
71. See supra note 5.
72. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076.
73. See id. at 1076-78.
74. See id. at 1077.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1076-78.
77. See id.
78. See supra notes 24 & 54.
79. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998) (recognizing the
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of constitutional, statutory, or common law precedence is controlling in the
majority of the cases, while policy arguments tend only to reinforce claims
of evidentiary privilege.8" Even in Jaffee, a case often cited for its reliance
on policy arguments to create an evidentiary privilege, the existence of
widespread state support for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
ultimately convinced the Court to recognize that privilege.8" In his dissent,
Justice Scalia emphatically criticized the policy arguments in that case as
insufficient to justify the occasional injustice which would arise in federal
courts as a result of the recognized privilege.82
A standard that allows policy arguments alone to compel recognition
of an evidentiary privilege stands in stark contrast to the Nixon Court's
analysis as well. 3 According to the Nixon Court, the instant court's
standard would significantly frustrate the goals of the criminal justice
system by allowing an excessive number of evidentiary privileges in
federal criminal proceedings." The new standard would open the door to
claims of privilege whenever a contemporary policy argument captured the
public's interest.85 Such a standard would extend beyond the contemplation
of the Nixon Court.86
Thus, in contrast to the great weight of authority, the instant court's
broad deviation from the common law departs from the reason and
experience which has kept this area of the law consistent over the past
twenty years.87 Even after considering the court's decision in the context
of contemporary policies and politics, the instant court's reasoning for
adopting this inconsistent standard is not readily apparent. Whatever the

attorney client privilege as one of the oldest privileges for confidential communications); Jaffee,
518 U.S. at 12 (recognizing that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was supported by all fifty
states, the District of Columbia and the legislative history of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1979) (recognizing that the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony has ancient roots and that it should not be casually cast aside).
80. See supra note 79.
81. See supra note 54.
82. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recognized that
psychotherapy undoubtedly is beneficial to individuals with mental problems, and that it surely
serves some larger social interest by contributing to the maintenance of a mentally stable society.
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his mind however, the court failed to consider the most important
questions in their inquiry. See id. Were these values "of such importance, and is the contribution
of psychotherapy to them so distinctive, and is the application of normal evidentiary rules so
destructive to psychotherapy, as to justify making our federal courts occasional instruments of
injustice?" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-10.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073,1076-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied,Rubin v. United
States, 119 S. CL 461 (1998).
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instant court's reasoning, the continued validity of a standard which
discounts the value ofprecedence and instead turns to policy arguments for
primary support is quite unsettled.
The creation of an evidentiary privilege by the judiciary is indeed a rare
occurrence. The instant court's denial of a protective function privilege for
officers of the Secret Service illustrates the reluctance which courts have
traditionally exhibited when confronted with a claim of evidentiary
privilege. However, the instant court's bold statement that policy
arguments, by themselves, may be sufficient to support a claim of
evidentiary privilege is simply untenable when considered against the great
weight of authority. In each case recognizing a privilege there has been at
least some principal support from constitutional, common law, or statutory
sources. In the absence of such support, no policy argument will overcome
the lofty standard which the federal courts have created for the recognition
of an evidentiary privilege.
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